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Chapter 6 
SEARCH FOR A MALEVOLENT NEEDLE IN A 
BENIGN HAYSTACK 
 
D. P. Gaver, K. D. Glazebrook, and P. A. Jacobs 
 
Abstract: A domain contains a number w of non-hostile White (W) individuals: humans, 
vehicles, ships. A hostile Red (R) individual enters the domain and travels 
through the domain towards targets. If R reaches an attractive valuable target, 
perhaps a crowd of people on land or a ship at sea containing liquid natural gas 
(LNG), it attacks the target. A Blue counter-terrorist, C, patrols the domain 
and classifies (perhaps incorrectly) individuals of interest as R or W. The 
probability of correct classification is an increasing function of the time spent 
classifying an individual. The misclassification of a W as an R is a false 
positive; misclassification of the R as a W is a false negative. C follows (or 
tracks) any individual it classifies as R until it is relieved by another platform 
or individual that may neutralize the possible R. C is unable to detect and 
classify additional individuals while it is following a suspicious individual. A 
small classification time may yield many false positives that C must service. A 
large classification time may result in R achieving its goal before being 
neutralized, so an appropriate compromise is sought. 
A game-theoretic model is formulated and studied to evaluate the 
probability that R is successfully neutralized before achieving its goal. C’s 
policy is to choose a classification time. Targets have independent identically 
distributed (iid) values, and R’s policy is to specify a target value threshold; R 
will attack the first target it finds whose value exceeds the threshold unless 
neutralized first. 




1. INTRODUCTION AND FORMULATIONS 
Consider an arena (Kress, 2005) or domain, D (Gaver et al., 2006; Gaver 
et al., to appear), i.e., a spatial region, in which a collection of 
benign/harmless entities, called Whites (Ws) gather. These can be 
passengers and accompanying individuals in a boarding lounge awaiting an 
airline flight, bus, or other conveyance. Alternatively, the collection is a 
crowd of potential workers assembled to obtain jobs. Another example could 
be a group of military platforms parked closely outside a repair facility, or 
the collection of neutral vessels used for recreation, commerce or defense 
occupying a maritime domain neighboring a harbor; see Gaver et al., 2006; 
and Gaver et al., to appear). Still another could be a large queue outside a 
medical emergency care clinic or hospital; the queue is the result of a surge 
of injuries, possibly from natural causes, such as Katrina, (for instance the 
refugees being packed into the New Orleans Coliseum). There are many 
equally important examples. 
Such a collection-crowd-“haystack” is the natural target for a single 
suicide bomber, denoted R, or for a malevolently-inclined “Red” maritime 
domain invader, (e.g., a small boat), likely disguised to resemble benign Ws 
in size, appearance, and behavior. Presumably it will attempt to 
surreptitiously mingle with the White crowd and pick a moment for 
detonation that creates a maximum number of casualties. This suggests that 
R should seek to be in the part of D where most, or most-apparently-valuable 
Ws congregate. On the other hand, the effect of a suicide bomb in a densely 
packed region could be counterproductive: Ws near the explosion will likely 
be hit/killed, but their bodies shield those slightly further away; see Kress 
(2005). 
Now introduce (at 0t = , initiation of the process) a single friendly 
searcher-neutralizer into the domain D; denote such a “Blue” counter-
terrorist by C. In fact, there could be several such, and they need not be 
identical, but complementary; for example, on land, one or more areas could 
be equipped with active and sensitive trained dogs, which would be visible 
and tend to herd the R—along with some Ws—into a subdomain 'D D⊂  
that can be quickly searched by C; on the other hand if such herding 
occurred it might trigger early detonation by R. We omit such plausible 
modeling options for the present. 
The scenario is that C searches/detects/travels to an individual. The 
search/detect/travel times to successive individuals are independent and 
identically distributed (iid). The individual is then classified as either a W or 
an R; classification takes a time τ , a decision variable. The probability of a 
correct classification is an increasing function of τ . If the individual is 
classified as an R (perhaps incorrectly), the C follows/tracks the individual 
until it is relieved by another platform or individual. C then resumes 
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searching. The successive follow/tracking times are iid, and C cannot 
detect/classify other individuals while it is following a suspicious individual. 
There is a constant number of Ws in the domain; these could be individuals 
that are unclassified by other means. If the classification time τ  is too small, 
then C may be prone to misclassify Ws as Rs and may spend substantial time 
following benign individuals, increasing the possibility that R reaches its 
objective. If the classification time is too large, then R may reach its 
objective before C detects and correctly classifies it. 
We make the following assumptions: 
1. There is only one R. 
2. There is a constant number of Ws in the domain and detected individuals 
are obtained by sampling with replacement from the population of Ws 
and R. C does not retain or use information about individuals who were 
closely examined, classified, and then released. Once a W is classified as 
a W, it is not tagged, and may be classified again; correct tagging can be 
a great advantage, but incorrect tagging can be enormously counter 
productive. We postpone the discussion of tradeoffs. Alternatively, a 
classified W is replaced by another W entering the domain. 
3. The W’s are a subset of the entire population. The remainder of the 
population is classified as harmless as a result of a first cursory 
surveillance; we assume that this first cursory surveillance is perfect. The 
Ws are members of the population that are subject to further surveillance. 
Section 2 presents an optimization model where the goal is the 
maximization of the probability that C successfully neutralizes R. Examples 
are presented illustrating the tradeoff between a large classification time τ  
resulting in a larger probability of correct classification but also a smaller 
effective search rate. Section 3 presents a game that elaborates the model for 
R. Possible targets for R have iid values. R encounters targets according to a 
Poisson process. R kills the first target it encounters whose value exceeds a 
predetermined threshold, unless C neutralizes R first. C chooses a 
classification time τ  to minimize the maximum value of the expected killed 
target value, while R chooses a threshold value to maximize the minimum 
expected killed target value. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. STOCHASTIC MODEL 1 
In this model, R detonates after an exponential time, presumably when 
near a valuable target. The model of Section 3 makes this more explicit. 




dtδ  = the probability that R detonates in ( ),t t dt+ , given that it has not 
done so before t , and has not been neutralized by C. Choice of detonation to 
achieve a specified value/effect is considered later in Section 3. Note: We 
could let ( )
s s
xδ δ= , where x  stands for various conditions, such as elapsed 
time or environmental conditions; omitted for present. 
D= time to detonate if not neutralized. We let D  be random having an 
exponential distribution: 
{ } [ ]| Not neutralized exp
s
P t tδ> = −D . (2.1) 
c
T  is a random time from when C has finished processing (classifying 
and perhaps tracking) a detected individual until C detects and travels to 
another member of the Ws or the single R in D; 
c
T  will depend on the size 
of the domain, the environment, the number of Ws in the domain, C’s speed, 

















i ) is the probability that the 
detected individual is the R (respectively, a benign W). 
Let ( )
rr
p τ  be the conditional probability that the detected R is classified 
as R when τ  time units are spent classifying it; ( )
rr
p τ  is an increasing 
function of τ  where τ  is a decision parameter. The probability that the 
detected R is misclassified is ( ) ( )1
rw rr
p pτ τ= − . Similarly, let ( )
ww
p τ  be 
the conditional probability that a detected W is classified as W when τ  time 
units are spent classifying it; ( ) ( )1
wr ww
p pτ τ= −  is the probability that a 
detected W is misclassified as R (a false positive). The response to a false 
positive is that the counter-terrorist, C, takes intensive (but futile) action to 
thwart a potential suicide attack (e.g., by neutralizing or disabling the 
misidentified attacker, thus unnecessarily losing valuable search time). 
Let 
c
X  be a random service or response time to thoroughly examine and 
neutralize a captured true R (provided that it is disabled before detonation), 
or to examine and release a false positive W. Successive response times are 
iid. The response time is in addition to the classification time. Of course, the 
response time is a penalty time to C if the examination/neutralization is of a 
W that was incorrectly classified as R. During this time, C is occupied by 
following and neutralizing the potential R and cannot search for other 
possible Rs. Neutralization involves tracking the suspicious individual until 
escort personnel arrive, after which the suspicious individual is escorted to 
another position for further examination. If R detects unusual attention by 
something it interprets as C, it may well detonate shortly before 
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apprehension by C; however, R might also choose to leave D in that case, or 
attempt to sidle close to C and then detonate, thus achieving an extra bonus. 
We do not treat such concept of operations on the part of R here, but intend 
to do so in later work. 
( )
cr
τI = the total elapsed clock/calendar time to detect, identify, and 
neutralize the (true) R when the classification time is τ . For simplicity, this 
includes the (random) time “used up” in discovering that potential Rs are 
actually benign, (i.e., that they are instead harmless Ws). We presume that 
neutralization of a suspect is not terminal; the suspect is fully disabled and 
searched, possibly off-site. In some cases, this will be wasted time, of 
course. A serious issue to avoid would be serious harm to an individual that 
turns out to be an innocent bystander. 
Conditional on ( )
cr
τI , the time to neutralize R, the probability that R is 
neutralized in time (before detonation) is ( )exp
s cr
δ τ−  I . This event (pre-
emptive neutralization) can take place under two conditions: 
(i) the first time C detects a suspicious individual, that individual is R, 
and is correctly identified, and thoroughly neutralized; or 
(ii) the first time C detects a suspicious individual, that individual is R 
and that individual is misclassified and released, or that individual is a W 
and is correctly classified and released. At this point the search begins over 
from scratch, as in renewal theory. 
Note (again) that the present model is (conservatively) memoryless: there 
is no tagging or labeling of those suspicious individuals that are released. 
Correct tagging would increase the rate at which R could be neutralized, and 
is a strong candidate for future study. However, high rates of incorrect 
tagging could lead to severe degradation of C’s operational success. 
Let the unconditional probability that R is detected and neutralized before 
it detonates be given by 
( ) ( )s crBP E e
δ τ
τ
− =   
I . (2.2) 
This is the success probability for C when τ  time units are spent 
classifying a suspicious individual. Conditionally, using (i) and (ii), we have 
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Solving gives C’s success probability: 
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Note that the term (c*) in equation (2.3) could be modeled in several 
alternative ways. First, W can be incorrectly classified as R in which case C 
tracks the W for a relatively short time 
c
X  until relieved by an auxiliary 
platform with a sensor, (e.g. an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)). In this 
case, C may simply cease searching, or move to another area, so the search 
may never re-start; in this case, R will never be detected. Alternatively, W 
can be incorrectly classified as R, and 
c
X  represents the relatively long time 
for an escort team to arrive and assume responsibility for the target. Then the 
C may begin searching again if at the termination the target is identified as 
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an innocuous W. Variations in equation (2.3) can therefore be justified (e.g., 
if Blue search incorrectly terminates), but are not included here. 
EXAMPLE 
All numerical examples will use the following maritime domain 
protection scenario. An aircraft, C, is patrolling a rectangular domain; 
x
M  is 
the x-distance of the rectangular domain; 
y
M  is the y-distance of the 
domain. R is a small boat carrying explosives. C uses a sensor to search the 
domain. The footprint of the sensor is a square with length of a side equal to 
f . The total time for C to cover a one-footprint square is /
s
f v ; 
s
v is the 









; the mean time between detection of individuals is 
[ ]2/ / 1x y
s
f
M M f w
v
  × +   
, where w  is the (constant) number of benign Ws 
in the domain. When C classifies a vessel as R, it tracks the vessel until it is 
relieved by another platform. 
For illustration, let 





 is the time at which the probability of correct 
classification is 0.5. Note that ( )
ww
p τ  is a cumulative Fréchet distribution 
function (which optimistically approaches unity for τ  increasing). The 
parameters α  and β  (both positive) are determined here by specifying two 
quantiles (in this case the median, 
0.5τ




). If data 
were available, α  and β  could be statistically estimated using maximum 
likelihood or Bayes inference. Since ( ) ( )
ww rr
p pτ τ= , we are assuming that 
R is attempting to blend in with Ws in the domain (although there are of 
course other possibilities). Table 6-1 displays some parameter values. 
Figure 6-1 displays the probability that R is neutralized before it 
detonates as a function of the time spent classifying a detected individual, 
when the search/detect travel times 
c
T and the additional time the sensor is 
engaged for response to an individual classified as R (service/response time) 
c
X  are both gamma distributed with shape parameter 0.1. The mean 
response time is 0.2 hours. For comparison, if there are no benign vessels, 
and classification takes no time and is perfect, then the probability of 
neutralizing R is 0.82. 
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Table 6-1. Parameter values for Model 1 
[ ]cE T  Mean time to search/detect a suspicious individual (hrs.) Variable 




Probability of correct classification 
0.5
3/ 60τ =  hrs. 
0.9
6 / 60τ =  hrs. 
β  Parameter (“shape”) for the probability of correct 
classification 
2.72 
α  Parameter (“scale”) for the probability of correct 
classification 
0.0002 
w  Number of benign Ws in the domain Variable 
1
r w
k k= −  Probability detected individual is the R ( )1/ 1 w+  
[ ]cE X  Mean time for second more intensive inspection 




δ  Mean time until the R detonates if it is not neutralized 
(hrs.) 
6 
f  Side of square sensor footprint in nautical miles (nm) 10 
s
v  Velocity of sensor platform in knots (kts) 250 
x
M  Length of x-direction of rectangular domain (nm) 75 
y
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Figure 6-1. Probability R is neutralized in Model 1. 
DISCUSSION 
The optimal classification time decreases a little as the number of benign 
Ws in the domain increases. However, even if the estimate of the number of 
Ws is wrong, the optimal classification time still seems to perform 
reasonably well. The probability of neutralizing R is sensitive to the number 
of benign Ws. Fewer benign Ws in the domain result in larger times between 
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detections of suspicious individuals, and a larger probability of neutralizing 
R. Results of Gaver et al. (2006, to appear) suggest that the probability of 
neutralizing R is sensitive to the distribution of the travel and response times. 
Note also that a large classification time is less harmful than a short time. 
The sensitivity of the best classification times to the model assumptions 
and the parametric form for the probability of correct classification is next 
explored. The model parameters are those of Table 6-1 unless otherwise 
displayed in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2. Parameter values for sensitivity analysis 
[ ]cE T  Mean time between detections of suspicious individuals 
(hrs.) 
0.5 
( ) ( )
rr ww
p pτ τ=  Probability of correct classification  0.5 3 / 60 hrs.τ =  
0.9
 Variableτ =  
β  Parameter (“shape”) for the probability of correct 
classification 
Variable 
α  Parameter (“scale”) for the probability of correct 
classification 
Variable 
w  Number of benign Ws in the domain 5 
[ ]cE X  Mean response time (hrs.) 0.1 
 
Three distributional forms are considered for the search/travel times to 
individuals and the additional time the searcher is engaged when an 
individual is classified as R (response time). In each case, the distributional 
family is the same for both times. The distributions considered are constant 
times, exponential distributions, and gamma distributions with shape 
parameter 0.1. The means of the travel (respectively, response) times are 
equal in all cases. 
Two functional forms are considered for the probability of correct 
classification when the classification time is τ . These forms are the Fréchet 
distribution in (2.5) and the Weibull distribution, 
( ) ( ) { }1 exp .ww rrp p βτ τ ατ= = − −  (2.6) 
In both cases, the parameters α  and β  are found by specifying the 
median and 90
th
 percentile of the distribution. The median is 
0.5 0.05τ =  
hours in all cases. The classification times considered are only those greater 
than or equal to the median of the time for correct classification (i.e. the 
probability of correct classification is at least 0.50). 
Figures 6-2a and 6-2b display the classification times τ  that maximize 












































































Figure 6-2b. Best classification time for Model 1 with Weibull probability of correct 
classification. 
( ) ( )0.9 0.9 0.9ww rrp pτ τ= = . Figure 6-3 displays the resulting probabilities of 
correct classification for the best classification time using the Fréchet 
probability of correct classification from equation (2.5). Figure 6-4 displays 
6. Search for a Malevolent Needle in a Benign Haystack 135
 
results comparing the use of different C classification times when C’s travel 
and response times have a gamma distribution with shape parameter 0.1 and 
the classification probabilities are given by equation (2.5). Figure 6-4 
displays: the resulting maximum probability of neutralizing R; the 
probability of neutralizing R if the classification time is given by 
0.9τ τ=
; 
the probability of neutralizing R if 
0.5τ τ=
; the probability of neutralizing R 
for the policy that uses the (incorrect) exponential distribution for the travel 
and response times; and the probability of neutralizing R for the policy that 
uses the (incorrect) Weibull distribution for the classification probabilities. 
For comparison, if the classification time is 0 and classification is perfect, 













































Figure 6-3. Probability of correct classification for the best classification time in Model 1 
with Fréchet probability of correct classification. 
As can be seen, the best classification times are smaller for travel and 
response times having gamma distributions with shape parameter 0.1 than 
for the other cases. Since the travel times and response times are more likely 
to be less than their means in the gamma case, one can afford to have a 
slightly smaller probability of correct classification. The maximizing 
classification times are apparently concave as a function of 
0.9
τ . If 
0.9
τ  is 
close to 
0.5τ
, then the maximizing classification time is close to (but larger 
than) 
0.9τ
; it increases as 
0.9τ
 increases and results in a maximum 
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Figure 6-4. Probability R is neutralized when the classification time is based on an incorrect 
model and the correct model is Fréchet. 
becomes too large (with respect to 
0.5 0.05τ = ), and the maximizing 
classification time begins to decrease slightly, with the resulting probability 
of correct classification decreasing to about 0.7. In Figure 6-4, the 
probability of neutralizing R is about the same regardless of whether the 
classification time is based on the correct model, the incorrect exponential 
distribution, or the incorrect Weibull distribution. In fact in Figure 6-4, the 
probabilities of neutralizing R are indistinguishable for these cases. Thus, 
Figure 6-4 suggests that the best classification times are somewhat 
insensitive to these model assumptions. 
3. STOCHASTIC MODEL 2 
A lethal Red, R, stalks groups or clusters of neutral Whites at random in 
an arena or domain. Assume that R eventually identifies a group of 
sufficiently high threshold value; the value is the size of the group or the 
importance of its constituency. The R mingles with this group and self-
destructs, reducing the value of the group from V  to 0 'V V≤ ≤ . Given that 
one (or more) counter-terrorists are in search of R, and require time to 
thoroughly identify a suspect—which may be ill-advised if the suspect is 
only a harmless White (W)—what is an optimal strategy for R to pick a 
target group, and for the counter-terrorist C to detain a potential R, when 
there is a chance that C is actually neutralizing a neutral (White)? 
6. Search for a Malevolent Needle in a Benign Haystack 137
 
Suppose R encounters or contacts groups of possible targets at random in 
a Poisson manner at rate λ , and suppose the ith group to appear has a 
random value, 
i
V ; the values of the various groups are assumed iid. It may 
be that 
i
V  is merely the number of individuals in the group, but it could also 
be the value associated with a single exceptional individual (person, or 
platform). If F  is the distribution from which the collection of { }iV  is 













t F v tF v
t







− −  − 
≤ =   
= ≡
∑V  (3.1) 
While R hunts for valuable White targets, Blue C searches for R as 
effectively and surreptitiously as possible. 
R chooses a minimum threshold value ω  for a target to pursue. R 
detonates the first time it encounters a target with value at least ω . The time 
until R detonates, D , has an exponential distribution with mean 
( ) ( ) ( )1/ 1/ 1 1/
s
F Fδ ω λ ω λ ω= − ≡   . (3.2) 
3.1 Blue Searcher Strategy 
The Blue searcher, C, covers or searches the domain. C chooses a time τ  
to spend classifying detected individuals. The probability that R does not 
detonate before it is neutralized is ( )BP τ  given in equations (2.4a–2.4b) 
with ( )
s s
δ δ ω=  given by equation (3.2). Hence, the expected lethal value 





















Viewing the problem as a game with opposed objectives, we have: 
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Empirical evidence suggests that this game has a Nash equilibrium; see 
Figure 6-5. 
EXAMPLE 
Assume that the target values have an exponential distribution. The travel 
times of C between individuals, 
c
T , and the time until C is relieved after 
classifying an individual as R, 
c
X , are independent and exponentially 
distributed. Moreover, we assume that ( ) ( ) { }exp /ww rrp p βτ τ α τ= = −  for 
0.5τ τ> . Figure 6-5 displays the expected value of the return to R as a 
function of R’s threshold and C’s classification time for the model 
parameters displayed in Table 6-1. In Figure 6-5 [ ] 0.5
c
E =T  hours, 
[ ] 1
c
E =X  hours, the rate at which R encounters groups is 2 per hour, and 
the mean group size is 10. Note that the function apparently has a saddle 
point. 
Parameter values are displayed in Table 6-3. Table 6-4 displays the best 
policies for both C and R for various values of the mean time until C is 
relieved after classifying an individual as R, the number of Ws in the 
domain, and the mean target value. Table 6-4 displays results for two 
different distributions for C’s travel times and response times. The family of 
distributions is assumed to be the same for both travel times and response 
times; the two distributions are the exponential distribution and the gamma 
distribution with shape parameter 0.1 having the same mean as the 
exponential. Such a positively skewed gamma represents substantial spatial 
clumpiness of surface entities, hence permitting C to investigate several 
suspicious individuals in more rapid succession than would be true for the 
exponential case; see the right-most column of Table 6-4. 
DISCUSSION 
The expected lethal value achieved by R increases: as the mean time until 
the searcher is relieved, [ ]
c
E X , increases; as the mean target value  
 












































Figure 6-5. Expected value of the return to R. 
Table 6-3. Parameter values for Model 2 
( ) ( )
rr ww
p pτ τ=  Probability of correct classification 0.5 3 / 60hrs.τ =  
0.9
5 / 60hrs.τ =  
β  Parameter (“shape”) for the probability of correct 
classification 
3.69 





k k= −  Probability detected individual is the R ( )1/ 1 w+  
f  Side of square sensor footprint (nm) 10 
s
v  Velocity of sensor platform (kts) 250 
x
M  Length of x-direction of rectangular domain (nm) 20 
y
M  Length of y-direction of rectangular domain (nm) 20 
increases; and as the rate at which R encounters possible targets increases. 
The best threshold value ω  for R increases in the mean of 
c
X , the mean 
target value, the number of Ws, and the rate at which R encounters possible 
targets. The best classification time τ  for the searcher increases as the mean 
of 
c













































































































































































to depend strongly on the mean target value. The gamma distribution for the 
c
T  and 
c
X , results in shorter optimal classification times for the searcher 
than for the exponential distribution. Apparently, this is due to the fact that 
C’s travel times and response times are more likely to be less than their 
means in the gamma case than in the exponential case. The probability of 
neutralizing R decreases in λ , since small values of λ  reflect R’s difficulty 
finding targets; thus, it is apparently worthwhile to “harden” facilities in 
order to deny R access to potential targets. 
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The sensitivity of the searcher’s best classification times and best 
threshold values, ω , to model assumptions and parametric forms is now 
explored. The model parameters are those of Table 6-1, as modified by 
Table 6-2. The rate at which R encounters individuals is given by 2λ = , and 
the mean of the exponential target values is 5. As before, two distributional 
forms are considered for the searcher’s travel time and the response time 
with the same distributional family used for both times. The distributions 
considered are the exponential distribution and the gamma distribution with 
shape parameter 0.1. The means of the travel (respectively, response) times 
are equal in all cases. Two functional forms are considered for the 
probability of correct classification when the classification time is τ . These 
forms are the Fréchet distribution of equation (2.5) and the Weibull 
distribution of equation (2.6). As before, the parameters α  and β  are 
determined by specifying the median and 90
th
 percentile of the distribution 
and only classification times greater than or equal to the median are 
considered. 
Figures 6-6a and 6-6b display the optimal classification times τ  for 
various values of 
0.9τ
 when 
0.5 0.05τ = . Figure 6-7 displays the resulting 
probabilities of correct classification for the best classification times for the 
Fréchet classification probability function. Figure 6-8 (respectively Figure 6-9) 
displays the best threshold value, ω , (respectively, the expected target value 
achieved by R) for the two distributions for the searcher’s travel and response 
times. Figure 6-10 (respectively Figure 6-11) displays the resulting best game 
probability of neutralizing the R (respectively the expected target value 
achieved by R) for various choices of classification times when C’s travel and 
response times have a gamma distribution with shape parameter 0.1 and the 
probability of correct classification is of form (2.5); the classification times 




; the best classification 
time for the incorrect model of exponential times; and the best classification 
time for incorrect Weibull classification probabilities. In all cases R is 
assumed to use its optimal threshold value ω  for the correct model. 
The best classification times are smaller for travel and response times 
having gamma distributions with shape parameter 0.1 than for those with an 
exponential distribution. Since the travel and response times are more likely 
to be less than their means in the gamma case, one can afford to have a 
slightly smaller probability of correct classification. The maximizing 
classification times are apparently concave as a function of 
0.9τ
. Figure 6-8 
suggests that the maximizing threshold value for R is about the same 
regardless of whether the searcher’s travel and response times are 
exponential or gamma distributed. However, R achieves a lower expected 
































































Figure 6-6b. Best classification time for Model 2 with Weibull probability of correct 
classification. 
the exponential case. Figures 6-10 and 6-11 suggest setting the classification 
time equal to 
0.9
τ  results in almost the same probability of neutralizing R as 
using the optimal classification time for values of 
0.9
τ  between 0.06 hours 
and 0.4 hours; however, the probability of neutralizing R decreases for larger  
 












































Figure 6-7. Probability of correct classification for the best classification time in Model 2 


































τ . Thus, it is apparently worthwhile for the searcher to 
determine and use the optimal classification time at least when large 
classification times might be needed to achieve a 90% probability of correct 





























































Best Time: Incorrect Weibull Classification
Probability




Figure 6-10. Probability R is neutralized in Model 2 for various choices of classification time 
and R uses the best threshold for the correct model. 
neutralizing R is somewhat insensitive to both the distributional form of the 
searcher’s travel and response times and the model for the probability of 
correct classification. 
























Best Time: Incorrect Exponential Times




Figure 6-11. Expected target value achieved by R in Model 2 for various choices of 
classification time and R uses the best threshold for the correct model. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In the scenario described in this chapter, there are neutral individuals, 
Whites (W), and one hostile individual, Red (R), traveling within a domain. 
The R’s purpose is to attack a target. A patrolling counter-terrorist, C, 
detects individuals in the domain, and classifies them as W or R. The 
probability of correct classification is an increasing function of the 
classification time. C follows each individual that is classified as R (perhaps 
incorrectly) until relieved by others; during this time, C is unavailable to 
detect and classify additional individuals. The ability to detect and correctly 
classify R before R reaches its objective is influenced by the size of the 
domain, the number of Ws in the domain, and the probability of correctly 
classifying detected individuals. 
In both models, C wishes to choose the best classification time. If the 
classification time is too small, C will “waste time” following misclassified 
Ws, and thereby increase R’s chance of reaching its objective; if the 
classification time is too long, R will reach its objective before C can detect 
and neutralize it. In the initial model of Section 2, R reaches its objective 
after an exponential time if not neutralized before then; this exponential time 
is independent of C’s actions. In the model of Section 3, the targets have 
values, and R chooses a policy to maximize its expected reward (equal to 0 if 
R is neutralized, and equal to the value of the target if R reaches its 
objective). The numerical results suggest that the probability of neutralizing 
R resulting from the best policy is robust to incorrect specification of the 
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distribution of the travel and response times, provided the correct mean times 
are used. The numerical results also suggest that the neutralization probability 
corresponding to the best policy is robust to incorrect specification of the 
probability of correct classification as a function of time. The probability of 
neutralizing R can be increased by decreasing the number of unidentified 
neutral individuals and by decreasing the rate at which R encounters possible 
targets (possibly by hardening infrastructure, for example). 
The time until R achieves its objective has an exponential distribution for 
both of the models discussed here. However, the results of Gaver et al. 
(2006, to appear) suggest that the probability of neutralizing R is sensitive to 
the distribution of the time until R achieves its objective, so other functional 
forms should perhaps be considered. It would also be of interest to study the 
effect of C tagging those Ws it has already investigated. 
In the model of Section 3, R knows the distribution of target values. 
Another area of future study is the development of models in which R learns 
about its target population. In this case, we would expect R’s policy to 
depend on the variability of the target values. As the target values become 
more variable, we expect it would be worthwhile for R to spend more time 
observing target values before determining a threshold target value. Further, 
if the mean prior arrival rate is large, then we would expect that only a small 
amount of time would be needed by R to get good information about target 
values, reducing the risk of being neutralized. 
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